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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article considers what kind of market analysis appears when 
“objective intent” rules and standards are used to help decide international 
sales cases adjudicating quality of goods disputes and whether and how these 
decisions are consistent with the goals of uniformity, good faith, and 
international character. These goals are expressed in standards under the 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG” or 
“Convention”),1 a treaty entered into by a group of states that account for 
over two-thirds of world trade.2 The Convention’s usefulness in achieving 
article 7’s three standards: uniformity, good faith, and international 
character—along with a fourth goal, benefiting international trade,3—has 
been extensively debated in the literature.4 Critiques of the efficacy of the 
 1. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1989), 15 
U.S.C. App. (2003) [hereinafter CISG]. References to the CISG will be in the text as “article 7” etc. 
 2. Pace Law School, CISG Database: CISG by State (2002), at www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ 
cisg/text/casecit.html [hereinafter CISG Database] (last visited Jan. 27, 2005).  
 3. See C. BIANCA & M.J. BONELL, COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW (CISG) 
9 (1987) (“[The Convention’s] other objective consists in offering rules that will be more responsive 
than the traditional national laws to the effective needs of international trade.”). 
 4. See infra Part II.A for a brief description of major debates regarding these four objectives of 
the CISG. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss1/2
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CISG include the divergent legal systems, the broad standards, the meaning 
of “good faith,” and the criteria for “international character.”  
I will argue that the “situation” of international trade is well fit by the 
tribunals’ choices of analysis based on a particular type of market, discussed 
infra, which works with the social-political-economic system in which the 
CISG operates. By looking systematically at the way the market and other 
factors appear in the cases and at the institutional “system” that influences 
international trade, a new perspective can be adopted that illuminates the 
functioning of the CISG in terms of its goals.  
The CISG is interesting to study for at least two primary reasons. The 
practical reason is that international traders will not always agree to the 
governance of the Uniform Commercial Code.5 The theoretical reason is that 
the CISG is formed from a blend of legal systems.6 Thus, the CISG is an 
international system for private transactions that will potentially raise many 
questions as to its interpretation and how its objectives can be attained.  
This Article approaches these issues by examining the “objective intent” 
rules of articles 8(2) and 8(3). These rules are useful for interpreting the 
quality of goods standards expressed under article 35, and for analysing the 
“systems” that come into play in rendering the decisions. “Objective intent” 
means the understanding of a party’s intent that can be constructed by the 
deciding tribunal from the party’s statements and conduct, using the 
references of a reasonable person and certain article 8(3) “circumstances,”7 a 
concept that will be discussed infra. The term “objective intent” is used here 
because it is common in United States legal education. Many other standards 
under the CISG could also be analyzed using “objective intent”; for instance, 
articles 8(2) and 8(3) are useful for interpreting standards of reasonableness 
throughout the Convention.8  
 5. Secretary of State George P. Schultz noted a similar point when he submitted the CISG to the 
White House in 1983: “[O]ur sellers and buyers cannot expect that foreign trading partners will always 
agree on the applicability of United States law.” CISG, supra note 1, Letter of Submittal.  
 6. See infra Part II.C.2 for a discussion of this blending of legal systems. 
 7. See, e.g., E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, Article 8, in BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 3 (discussing 
mistakes and related issues, such as plausible and implausible price mistakes); Michael P. Van Alstine, 
Consensus, Dissensus, and Contractual Obligation Through the Prism of Uniform International Sales 
Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 57–59 (1996) (the goal under the CISG is to give effect to actual intent, 
through external expressions of intent). Although the CISG interprets objective intent more narrowly 
than traditional U.S. common law definitions, where “objective intent” means what a reasonable 
person generally in that society would believe, act, or conclude, the term will be used here with 
reference to article 8 to avoid introducing more complex terminology. See generally Bruno Zeller, 
Determining the Contractual Intent of Parties under the CISG and Common Law—A Comparative 
Analysis, 4 EUR. J.L. REFORM 629 (2002) (comparing subjective and objective intent in common, 
civil, and CISG law). 
 8. See Larry DiMatteo et al., The Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An Analysis of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Quality of goods has been chosen for a case study because the standards 
are broad and the underlying issue of quality is especially subject to 
litigation9 regardless of whether the provisions pertaining to quality per se 
were highly disputed in the drafting of the CISG.10 This Article analyzes and 
assesses the ways in which courts and arbitral tribunals use the “facts” of the 
cases to select the appropriate rules and standards from articles 8(2) and 8(3) 
in order to interpret the standards of article 35 as needed understandings that 
the parties have not addressed.11 
The first step in analyzing this decision-making system is to consider 
whether the “facts” and article 35 standards are associated in a way which is 
consistent. If there is a consistent association, then the conclusion reached 
has both theoretical and practical significance. Legal scholars and law 
reformers would like to know whether there is consistency in order to 
evaluate whether the goals of the CISG are being achieved. Practicing 
lawyers would like to know whether the principle that the facts of the case 
drive the outcome is borne out in the CISG. If it is, practice under the CISG 
will look more predictable and manageable, another sub-part of the goal of 
facilitating international trade. If particular types of facts or interpretive rules, 
such as market principles, are used often in the cases, it will be an important 
indication to scholars and practitioners of what arguments win, and will help 
to describe the system in which the CISG cases are decided. 
The second step in analyzing this system of decision-making is to 
consider whether the cases demonstrate that there is a “situational system” 
for deciding cases under the CISG. This consideration involves whether there 
is a consistent “text system” of the CISG-provisions that make logical and 
intuitive sense together.12 In order to implement the text system, an 
 
 
Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 Nw. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 299, 318 n.74 (2004) (collecting 
examples of the use of the term “reasonable”).  
 9. See JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONS 222 (3d ed. 1999) (“Most sales controversies grow out of disputes 
over whether the goods conform to the contract.”). 
 10. See infra notes 60–63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the major controversies and 
compromises in the drafting of the Convention. 
 11. HONNOLD, supra note 9, at 222 (“Consequently, courts and codifers [sic] have had to try to 
describe, in general terms, those understandings that would have been written into the contract if the 
parties had drafted a contract provision to deal specifically with the question that led to dispute.”). For 
a complementary analysis regarding the “sphere of influence” of buyer and seller, see generally René 
Franz Henschel, Conformity of Goods in International Sales Governed by CISG Article 35: Caveat 
Venditor, Caveat Emptor and Contract Law as Background Law and as a Competing Set of Rules, 
NORDIC J. COMM. L. (2004), http://www.njcl.fi/1_2004/article2.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2004). 
 12. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685, 1722 (1976) (stating that ideas may or may not form an intellectual system); Klaus Peter 
Berger, The Lex Mercatoria Doctrine and the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts, 28 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 943, 971 (1997) (pointing out that the UNIDROIT Principles 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss1/2
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international “institutional system” of some type is needed.13 Finally, the text 
and institutional components of this system need to be unified in a way suited 
to the international setting in which the decisions are made. To evaluate 
whether this is so, the cases are evaluated for whether the decisions are 
consistent with the “situation” in which they are made.14 This “situation” is 
comprised of the economic, political, and social components of the world in 
which international traders make their business decisions. This world is, 
loosely speaking, a regulated market economy in which institutions are 
critical to the functioning of markets, and markets are recognized as being 
prone to failure.15 
The two aspects of analysis of the system—whether the facts and legal 
standards and rules of the cases are systematically interrelated and whether 
there is an international “situational system” for deciding the cases—are 
themselves part of an interrelated whole. I will argue that the “text” system 
level of the cases, what we read as the decisions, will be significantly 
bolstered in consistency and efficacy if the text system is part of a 
“situational system” that is consistent with the world in which the cases are 
decided.  
The remaining four parts of this Article will consider these issues. Part II 
considers the nature of the text, institutional, and unified “situational” 
systems of the case decisions. This will include a consideration of where the 
CISG resides on the spectrums of certain dichotomies between legal systems 
and legal theories, and a discussion of the intellectual antecedents of the 
“situational” system. In Part III, a framework for analyzing the case law on 
“objective intent” in cases dealing with quality will be discussed. Part IV 
considers the quality standards and systematic associations of intent rules 
according to the “situational system” framework developed in Part II, with 
particular attention paid to what types of facts, standards, and rules are 
evident. In particular, Part IV examines the types of market analyses used in 
these cases, and how the mode of analysis affects their outcomes. The 
Conclusion considers whether the case facts are systematically associated 
 
 
can “assist the legal institutions to be seen . . . as a group with meaning and therefore as a ‘system.’”). 
 13. See infra Part II.B. 
 14. See infra Part II.C. 
 15. See, e.g., R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 14–15 (1988) (stating that 
markets are imperfect due to transactions costs); CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: 
THE WORLD’S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, 76–89 (1977) (discussing the ways markets fail); 
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 
(1990) (“[institutions] structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or 
economic.”); John H. Jackson, The Impact of China’s Accession on the WTO, in CHINA AND THE 
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 19–39 (Deborah Z. Cass et al. ed., 2003) (stating that markets will not work 
without institutions, citing the foregoing). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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with the quality standards according to the rules of “objective intent”; 
whether there is an international “situational” system for deciding the cases; 
and, if they are systematically decided, whether the “situational” system 
buttresses the decisions. Finally, the Conclusion considers how the market 
figures into the decisions, as this is of special interest to scholars and 
practitioners. 
II. A SITUATIONAL SYSTEM FOR QUALITY 
A. Text 
1. Good Faith, Uniformity and International Character (Article 7(1)) 
The text system of the CISG is built upon the three-pronged provision of 
article 7, which calls for “interpretation” with regard to three factors: “its 
international character and . . . the need to promote uniformity in its 
application and the observance of good faith in international trade.”16 I argue 
that these three provisions form part of a whole that should be considered 
together as part of a text system.17 This sub-part of the text system will be 
considered together with the provisions of articles 8 and 35 as part of a larger 
text system. 
The most problematic provision to be discussed here concerns good faith. 
Should this be regarded as good faith in interpretation,18 or good faith in 
performance, or even good faith in negotiations?19 If there is to be good faith 
 16. CISG, supra note 1, art. 7. 
 17. See Harry M. Flechtner, The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized System: 
Observations on Translations, Reservations and Other Challenges to the Uniformity Principle in 
Article 7(1), 17 J.L. & COM. 187, 205 (1998) (recognizing the triumvirate of interpretive objectives in 
article 7). 
 18. See John Felemegas, Comparative Editorial Remarks on the Concept of Good Faith in the 
CISG and the PECL, 13 PACE INT’L L. REV. 399, 400 (2001) (good faith in the CISG is limited to 
interpretation, not additional positive duties on the parties); Honorable Ulrich Magnus, Remarks on 
Good Faith: The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts, 10 PACE INT’L L. REV. 89, 94 (1998) (CISG does not contain a provision to imply good 
faith in contractual obligations). 
 19. See generally Phanesh Koneru, The International Interpretation of the UN Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: An Approach Based on General Principles, 6 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 105, 133–41 (1997) (reviewing theories of good faith in interpretation and good faith 
of the parties and concluding that both apply as “dual roles” of good faith); BIANCA & BONELL, supra 
note 3 (stating that most civil law systems have both a rule requiring good faith in performance and a 
rule requiring good faith in formation and interpretation of the contract, but which differ substantially); 
FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: CONVENTIONS AND 
COMMENTARY 56 (1992) (“Observance of the principle of good faith means to display such conduct as 
is normal among businessmen. . .”—i.e., not a heightened level of behavior or material justice); Rolf 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss1/2
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in negotiations, how is pre-contractual liability to be avoided, which calls 
into question the matter of “validity” of the contract, which is, unless 
expressly provided for, generally to be decided under domestic law pursuant 
to article 4?20 From the international trader’s point of view, is good faith in 
negotiations, or some assurance of redress for the lack of it, an essential part 
of dealing, particularly where the usual domestic, non-legal mechanisms of 
reputation and custom may be less operative? Thus, the question of whether 
good faith in negotiations will be observed is, loosely speaking, a question 
central to the international character of the CISG. Further along, we will see 
whether article 8 helps resolve these issues.21 Having joined these two 
provisions of article 7, which are often considered separately, it is important 
to consider how uniform provisions are to be observed.  
As Professor John Honnold, one of the drafters of the CISG, has put it, 
uniform “international words” are not enough to achieve the objective of 
uniformity.22 The CISG faces interpretation under different legal systems, by 
different types of tribunals; as a result, adequate uniformity is all that can be 
expected.23 
 
 
Herber, Article 7, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF 
GOODS (CISG) 63 (Peter Schlechtriem ed., Geoffrey Thomas trans., 2d ed. 1998) (“Despite its narrow 
wording, Article 7(1) cannot be confined to the interpretation of the CISG’s express rules.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, The CISG and the Presumption of Enforceability: Unintended 
Contractual Liability in International Business Dealings, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 111 (1997); Larry A. 
DiMatteo, An International Contract Law Formula: The Informality of International Business 
Transactions Plus the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Liability 
L+(ii)2, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 67 (1997); Diane Madeline Goderre, Comment & Casenote, 
International Negotiations Gone Sour: Precontractual Liability Under the United Nations Sales 
Convention, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 257 (1997). 
 21. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 22. See generally John Honnold, The Sales Convention in Action—Uniform International Words: 
Uniform Application?, 8 J.L. & COM. 207 (1988) (describing the hurdles to uniform application that 
remain despite accepted terminology); see also Franco Ferrari, The Relationship Between the UCC and 
the CISG and the Construction of Uniform Law, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1022–23 (1996) 
(explaining that similar terms such as “good faith” and “trade usages” in the CISG and the U.C.C. do 
not mean similar law). 
 23. See, e.g., Honnold, supra note 22, at 211–12 (“We cannot expect perfect uniformity in 
applying the Convention—or, for that matter, any other statute. But we can look forward to 
international commercial law that is more helpful and predictable than the present Babel of competing 
systems.”); Fletchner, supra note 17, at 205 (“[Article 7(1)] does not mandate absolute uniformity of 
results under the Convention. It provides only that, in interpreting the CISG, ‘regard is to be had . . . to 
the need to promote uniformity in its application . . .’”) (quoting CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1)); Philip 
Hackney, Comment, Is the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods Achieving 
Uniformity?, 61 LA. L. REV. 473, 485–86 (2001) (concluding that the Convention has resulted in 
adequate, but not absolute uniformity).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The question of international character focuses mainly on “autonomous 
interpretation” with reference to CISG and other international or comparative 
sources, rather than with regard to domestic law.24  
As part of the “international character” of CISG jurisprudence, two 
questions arise. Are analogies needed to other parts of the CISG, or are 
decisions based solely on the directly relevant provisions sufficient? Second, 
is it necessary for CISG decisions to cite decisions of other jurisdictions? 
These issues will be considered in Part IV.D. 
In order for the CISG to function, it must be regarded as meeting the 
practical needs of international sales law.25 It is not enough to have an 
elegant text system; a practical application for the CISG is also necessary.26 
The diversity of opinion during the CISG’s drafting evidences the need for 
provisions concerning areas of international sales law that are not covered by 
wide-spread, existing practices.  
The three objectives of article 7—uniformity, international character and 
good faith—figure heavily into the broader question of whether the CISG 
facilitates international trade and, in that sense, these three provisions are a 
“text system” that forms a sub-system of the CISG. In order to provide 
predictability and a foundation for planning, the decisions must have an 
adequate level of uniformity. As previously noted, some assurance that 
parties will negotiate in good faith would substantially benefit international 
 24. See, e.g., Camilla Baasch Andersen, Furthering the Uniform Application of the CISG: 
Sources of Law on the Internet, 10 PACE INT’L L. REV. 403, 404 (1998) (describing the need to look to 
international precedents); Peter M. Gerhart, The Sales Convention in Courts: Uniformity, Adaptability 
and Adoptability, in THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS REVISITED 77, 82–84 (Peter Sarcevic & 
Paul Volken eds., 2001) (stating that international character should be viewed as “legitimacy goals” of 
interpretation, including gap-filling and sovereignty); BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 3, at 72–75 
(stating international character means that interpretation should not be made with reference to the 
traditional techniques used to interpret domestic law). 
 25. See, e.g., Jorge Barrera Graf, John Honnold and the Vienna Convention on the International 
Sale of Goods, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 943, 946 (1984) (describing Mexico’s ratification of the CISG as a 
great benefit to Mexican law and Mexico’s international trade). 
 26. See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex 
Mercatoria), 2 EMORY J. INT’L DISP. RESOL. 235 (1988) (commenting that common customary 
practices for international trade are widespread); Peter B. Maggs, International Trade and Commerce, 
42 EMORY L.J. 449, 469 (1993) (paraphrasing Berman as arguing that “The goal of unification . . . 
should be to overcome these minor differences.”); id. at 466 (warning that codification can freeze the 
law and may not have been done well); Monica Kilian, CISG and the Problem with Common Law 
Jurisdictions, 10 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 217, 219 (2001) (stating “statute law, such as CISG, does 
not best serve lex mercatoria”); Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in 
International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743, 796 (1999) (warning that it is prudent to guard 
against bad unification of the law); James E. Bailey, Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law of International Sales, 
32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 273, 276 (1999) (stating, “the CISG is actually an obstacle to uniformity in the 
law of international sales”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss1/2
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traders. In order to achieve some level of uniformity, the decisions need to be 
made with reference to international, as opposed to domestic, law. 
Otherwise, each jurisdiction would develop its own diverse law for the CISG. 
Finally, the CISG needs to be accessible to traders and their lawyers in order 
to be of any use, which would be facilitated by an “institutional” system.  
Part II.A.2 addresses the ways in which the three objectives of article 7 
and the facilitation of international trade are served by articles 8(2) and 8(3) 
and, together, form a larger text system. 
2. Objective Intent (Articles 8(2) and 8(3)) 
Articles 8(2) and (3) are tools to accomplish the objectives of article 7. 
The three sub-sections of article 8 give context to how an international 
approach to interpreting the CISG is to proceed. First, sub-section 1 
addresses subjective intent and sets forth when article 8(2) will apply: 
“statements made by and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted 
according to his intent where the other party knew or could not have been 
unaware what that intent was.”27 
Thus, the issue of intent is raised by article 8(2). But what happens when 
the intent of the other party was not known or when the applicable party 
could not have been aware of the other party’s intent? The issue of objective 
intent is addressed in the next paragraph, which provides, “statements made 
by and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the 
understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party 
would have had in the same circumstances.”28 This sub-section sets forth a 
standard of a reasonable person in the circumstances.  
Finally, the third sub-section sets out how the circumstances are to be 
determined: “In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a 
reasonable person would have had, due consideration is to be given to all 
relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices 
which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any 
subsequent conduct of the parties.”29 The limits of the “circumstances” are 
not delimited. Furthermore, other factors may be considered as part of the 
“circumstances” for determining intent—for example, the market. 
These factors for determining what the applicable party or a reasonable 
person would have understood as the intent of the other party are standards 
under the CISG. In one sense, these are the facts of the case. In another sense, 
 27. CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(1). 
 28. CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(2). 
 29. CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(3). 
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these factors themselves blur into the law. This ambiguity underscores that 
these factors should not become rigid precedents and instead should be 
interpreted with flexibility in order to maintain the “fit” of the CISG to the 
world situation into the future.30 As such, the content of these provisions 
need to be regarded as “standards,” not “rules.”  
These circumstances, again, can be considered part of either the law or 
part of the facts. This may be the reason that, in CISG decisions, these factors 
are often labeled neither as part of the law nor as part of the facts.31 Because 
these principles of decision are widely applied, the need for flexibility is 
served by not labeling the “circumstance” criteria in any way. The quality of 
goods case law generally sees the “circumstance” criteria come into play 
regarding certain types of matters, such as the market. 
The case law on quality of goods deals largely with partial disagreements 
that occur after the contracts have been formed.32  
Article 8(2) is derived from the rule of interpretation that ambiguities 
should be construed against the sender, the drafter, or the speaker.33 Article 
8(2) is thus about communication. And though its subject is vague, article 
8(2) is a “rule,” not a “standard,” to the extent that meaning will be construed 
“against” the sender. Beyond that, however, what it means to “construe 
against” the sender may still be open to interpretation, thus making article 
8(2) both a “rule” and a “standard.”34  
Article 8(3) provides standards for addressing the “circumstances” of the 
case.35 Some of these standards are open-ended and leave ample room for 
considering markets or other criteria. Like the decision to apply article 8(2), 
deciding whether to apply article 8(3) is a rule. Article 8(3)’s enumerated 
 30. See Maggs, supra note 26, at 465–66 (noting hazards of codification are mainly from rules, 
not standards); HONNOLD, supra note 9, § 18 (stating that a statute or code must be short and general 
to have longevity). 
 31. See infra Part IV. 
 32. See Van Alstine, supra note 7, at 57–59 (discussing use of the term “partial dissensus” to 
conceptualize such disagreement). 
 33. See HONNOLD, supra note 9, § 107.1 (“Article 8(2) places the burden on one who prepares a 
communication or who drafts a contract to communicate clearly to a reasonable person in the same 
position as the other party.”); Harry M. Flechtner ed., Transcript of a Workshop on the Sales 
Convention: Leading CISG Scholars Discuss Contract Formation, Validity, Excuse for Hardship, 
Avoidance, Nachfrist, Contract Interpretation, Parol Evidence, Analogical Application, and Much 
More, 18 J.L. & COM. 191 (1999).  
It’s your obligation to make clear what you mean, your real intention. If you don’t, then the 
objective meaning from the view point of the person to whom the statement was addressed will be 
controlling. I think that’s a general rule you will find in many jurisdictions concerning the 
interpretation of declarations of intention. 
Id. at 250 (transcribing comments of Dr. Peter Schlechtriem). 
 34. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 35. CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(3). 
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factors and its open phrasing make its contents “standards” open to 
interpretation. The enumerated factors and the parties’ negotiations, 
practices, usages, and subsequent conduct may be supplemented by 
additional factors such as market conditions, the need for experts, the nature 
of the relevant manufacturing process, the needs for health or other 
regulations, and the nature of any particular uses for the goods. Professor 
Amy Kastely once urged that courts and tribunals consider the parties’ 
characteristics as this would render the CISG capable of being used by 
parties from different backgrounds and cultures.36  
The cases will show, however, that articles 8(2) and 8(3) are most widely 
used to identify relevant features of the market, either directly or through the 
use of experts or custom. Market conditions prevail in CISG jurisprudence. 
How those market conditions may be characterized is examined in Parts IV 
and V. 
The tools of articles 8(2) and 8(3) are thus available to advance the goals 
of article 7, forming a partial “text system.”37 Having a means by which to 
interpret intent furthers the goal of good faith in negotiations, even though 
that goal is probably not a part of article 7, which is limited to good faith in 
interpretation.38 This helps the international trader to obtain recourse where 
traditional domestic, non-legal enforcement mechanisms, like reputation, 
may not function as well. Interpreting intent through specific criteria allows 
an internal reference39 that will advance autonomous interpretation, the other 
portion of international character. With a guide to interpreting intent, uniform 
decisions will be likely. The preceding two goals are further advanced by the 
mechanism used for determining intent. The combination and advancement 
of good faith, international character, and uniform decisions will thus help to 
further the goal of facilitating international trade. The interrelationship of 
these provisions, both on logical and intuitive levels, makes article 7 and 
articles 8(2) and 8(3) part of a “text system.” 
Article 35, which concerns the quality of the goods issue, enables this 
interrelationship. Article 35 is introduced in the next sub-part. The cases will 
be discussed in Part IV. 
 36. Amy H. Kastely, Unification and Community: A Rhetorical Analysis of the United Nations 
Sales Convention, 8 NW. J. INT’L L & BUS. 574, 608–20 (1988). 
 37. See Werner Junge, Article 8, in Schlechtriem, supra note 19, at 72 (“Article 8(2) [takes] into 
account good faith and prevailing practice . . . in conformity with Article 7(1).”). 
 38. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 39. See Flechtner, supra note 33, at 249 (resolving gaps through internal references). 
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3. Quality of Goods (Articles 35(1) and 35(2)) 
Quality of the goods is a ubiquitous issue40 and is thus the focus of the 
cases analyzed in this Article. In this sense, quality is a case study for the 
operation of articles 8(2) and 8(3).  
The quality of the goods issue under the CISG is governed by articles 
35(1) and 35(2). Article 35(1) provides: “The seller must deliver goods 
which are of the quantity, quality and description required by the contract 
and which are contained or packaged in the manner required by the 
contract.”41 Thus, the specifications must be met and the packaging must be 
secure.  
Articles 35(2)(a) and 35(2)(b) provide warranties for ordinary use and use 
for a particular purpose, respectively. Article 35(2) provides  
Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not 
conform with the contract unless they: 
 (a) are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description 
would ordinarily be used; 
 (b) are fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made 
known to the seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract, except 
where the circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or that it 
was unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller’s skill and judgment. 
. . .42 
Samples and models are addressed in Article 35(2)(c), which requires that 
they must “possess the qualities of goods which the seller has held out to the 
buyer as a sample or model.”43  
Packaging must adequately protect the goods. Article 35(2)(d) provides 
that goods be “contained or packaged in the manner usual for such goods or, 
where there is no such manner, in a manner adequate to preserve and protect 
the goods.”44 
The quality provisions are standards; a computer could not decide an 
issue of quality without further rules and data. These standards, unlike the 
reasonableness standards, provide guidance without reliance on other 
provisions.45  
 40. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 41. CISG, supra note 1, art. 35(1). 
 42. CISG, supra note 1, art. 35(2)(a) and (b). 
 43. CISG, supra note 1, art. 35(2)(c). 
 44. CISG, supra note 1, art. 35(2)(d). 
 45. See supra Parts II.A.1 and II.A.2. 
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The article 8(2) and 8(3) provisions, particularly those pertaining to the 
“circumstances” that may bear on the decision, such as the market, 
pervasively affect the results in cases dealing with quality, as will be shown 
in Part IV and discussed in conclusion. The extent to which the article 35 
quality standards are part of a text system with articles 7 and 8 will be seen 
throughout the argument of Parts IV and V, regarding the total “situational 
system” created by these provisions. 
The cases that show how the quality issues are handled under the CISG 
are decided in domestic courts and international arbitration tribunals. To 
what extent are these fora part of an international community able to apply 
the CISG? 
B. Institutions: A Growing Community Around the CISG 
International arbitral tribunals and domestic courts around the world have 
access to databases regarding the CISG. This factor unifies a community of 
people around the text of the CISG.46 The CISG is being taught in law 
schools in the United States.47 Decisions are published in the Pace, Unilex, 
and Clout databases, and a variety of scholarly treatises. The databases also 
reference an abundance of scholarly articles.  
Professor Kastely once called for an international community of lawyers 
and scholars using the CISG, in addition to the sources and databases.48 This 
is now the case. The CISG is accepted by international lawyers in the United 
States, per the commentary of V. Susanne Cook, a practitioner and long-time 
author on the CISG.49 The Pace database shows extensive case law in 
Europe, suggesting that the CISG is widely accepted there as well.50 In 
China, the new contract law is partly based on the CISG.51 All of this 
suggests that the CISG is widely accepted in most jurisdictions where it was 
adopted.52 Jurisdictions like Japan, which have not adopted the CISG, have 
produced interesting scholarship, including a Japanese study of artificial 
 46. For a comprehensive summary of the major sources available on the CISG, see HONNOLD, 
supra note 9; CISG Database, supra note 2. 
 47. See William S. Dodge, Teaching the CISG in Contracts, 50 J. LEGAL ED. 72 (2000) 
(choosing selections for inclusion in contracts classes). 
 48. See Kastely, supra note 36, at 620–21. 
 49. See V. Suzanne Cook, CISG: From the Perspective of the Practitioner, 17 J.L. & COM. 343 
(1998). “There is little hesitation to embrace CISG as a solid compromise position if the application of 
the U.C.C. is not available.” Id. at 353. 
 50. See cases cited infra in Part IV; see also John O. Honnold, The Sales Convention: From Idea 
to Practice, 17 J.L. & COM. 181, 183 (1998) (describing the extensive case law in central Europe). 
 51. See DETLEV F. VAGTS, WILLIAM S. DODGE & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL 
BUSINESS PROBLEMS 286 (3d ed. 2003). 
 52. Cook, supra note 49, at 353. 
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intelligence and the CISG.53 Given the effectiveness of the Convention in 
countries adhering to the Convention since 1988, approximately sixteen 
years at this writing, the growth in the CISG community is striking. With 
access to databases and scholarly writings, the people and institutions 
working with the CISG can genuinely be called a community. The 
uniformity of the cases from many jurisdictions discussed in Part IV suggests 
a high awareness of each other’s work.  
The nature of the institutions and this community around the text of the 
CISG is open to question. Whose law is this? Is it truly international, or is it a 
product of one or another legal system or jurisdiction? Is it a law of rules or 
standards or both? Does that affect whose law it is? 
C. “Situation” Analysis: A Dovetailing of Social Work and Contract 
Theory 
1. Rules and Standards 
To show the ubiquitous nature of “standards,” for the purposes of this 
Article, “rules” will initially be considered to be operations that could be 
performed by a computer, that is, binary operations. An example of a rule 
might sometimes be stated as a statutory provision that notice must be given 
within ten days. However, even that provision could be open to some 
interpretation. Maybe a provision for 240 hours or 14,400 minutes or 
864,000 seconds might be more accurate. Similarly, such a provision could 
be open to some interpretation because the parties might not accurately 
record when the time-period was to begin and end. Another example would 
be a contract specification that the tram attain a particular normal operating 
speed, or withstand certain levels of strain on the engine. It may also specify 
what constitutes “normal operating,” including the road conditions and grade 
upon which the train would be operated.54  
“Standards,” in this line of argument, are every other type of provision,55 
and they come into play particularly where flexibility in or development of 
the law are important.56 For instance, a standard may require a good to be fit 
for a particular purpose.57 An example of such a standard in a contractual 
 53. See Flechtner, supra note 33 (reproducing a discussion of the effects of Japanese artificial 
intelligence on the CISG). 
 54. Cf. the Tram case, infra notes 140–47 and accompanying text. 
 55. Rules and standards are subject to a vast literature and to wide-spread discussion at law 
schools. For a look into this literature, see Kennedy, supra note 12. 
 56. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 57. CISG, supra note 1, art. 35(b). 
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provision is “suitable for use as a tourist tram.” Many questions could arise 
from a provision like this regarding the tram’s size, speed, seating, or safety. 
Article 8(2) is thus a “rule,” in which meaning is construed against the 
sender, subject to applicable standards.58 If a clear meaning cannot be 
determined, the issue will be resolved against the sender. What constitutes 
“resolved” may, however, be subject to a standard. If the issue at hand is the 
suitability of a vehicle for use “as a tourist tram” and no speed requirement is 
specified, then the ambiguous or missing provision may be construed against 
the buyer and any reasonable speed may be considered adequate. One court 
determined that a tourist tram’s actual speed, twenty-five kilometers per 
hour, sufficed even though the buyer, in retrospect, had demanded a speed of 
forty kilometers per hour.59 But what if the speed of the tram had been only 
ten kilometers per hour? Or what if the tram had gone forty kilometers per 
hour on the flat, but the tram was intended for use in San Francisco?  
Thus, “rules” and “standards” are not merely black and white, but are on a 
spectrum. The only “bright line” meaning for “rule” that could be rigorously 
defended, however, would be a provision that is a binary operation (thus, one 
that can be performed by a computer).  
In this Article, provisions such as “construe against,” or “apply market 
criteria,” will be called rules. The content of the provisions applied will be 
the standards.  
To the extent that article 8(2) can be applied as a “rule,” article 8(2) can 
be used to decide cases within its terms. In other cases, article 8(2) needs the 
help of article 8(3). This is not to say that article 8(2) relies on analogy to 
other CISG provisions; the reference is to the application of article 8(3). 
There is thus an interplay of “rules” and “standards” in articles 8(2) and 8(3). 
The interplay of rules and standards will be seen again in the following 
section. 
2. The CISG is a Compromise Along Many Dimensions: The 
Spectrums of Certain Dichotomies  
The drafting of the Convention resulted in compromises along many 
dimensions: Common Law/Civil Law/Socialist Law systems, North/South, 
East/West and developed/developing countries.60 Today, the former Soviet 
 58. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 59. See infra notes 140–47 and accompanying text. 
 60. See Gabrielle S. Brussel, The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods: A Legislative Study of the North-South Debates, 6 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 53, 
54 (1993) (noting that the South wanted protection as purchasers and that North wanted freedom of 
contract); Gyula Eorsi, A Propos the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
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bloc is no more and China’s markets have become much more flexible.61 The 
character of the compromises suggests that it is not meaningful to speak of 
the CISG as a compromise along any one dimension.62 Rather, it is truly an 
international law contained in a truly international text.63 
On another plane, however, it is interesting to look at one classic contract 
law article, Professor Duncan Kennedy’s 1976 Form and Substance in 
Private Law Adjudication,64 which suggested that there was a dichotomy 
between individualism and altruism, of which one aspect was the debate 
between rules and standards.65  
The dichotomy between individualism and altruism has four components: 
“regulation vs. facilitation,” a bargaining power issue; “community vs. 
autonomy,” a validity issue; “paternalism vs. self-determination,” dealing 
with mistake and related issues; and the “standards vs. rules” dichotomy.66 
The CISG by its terms legislates neither side of the four component 
dichotomies. Through the article 4 exclusion of issues like voiding contracts, 
torts, and consideration, some features of altruism are often legislated out in 
the three “substantive” dichotomies.67  
In each of the three, however, substantial examples of legislating in 
altruism are present. Between “regulation vs. facilitation,” the issue is 
bargaining power,68 which is often an issue when deciding whether to void 
the contract; yet, “reasonableness,” a major issue of fairness, is pervasive in 
the CISG,69 and interpreting reasonableness is a major issue concerning 
article 8. Between “community vs. autonomy,” torts and voidness issues are 
again legislated out of the CISG in article 4, but the article 8 issues of 
 
 
of Goods, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 333, 341–56 (1983) (describing competing points of view from Socialist 
and Western legal systems, from the North and the South, and from the continental and common law 
systems); Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods, 23 INT’L LAW. 443, 467 (1989) (discussing good faith 
compromises). This may suggest that the development of CISG case law has been facilitated by the 
growing level of technological production in countries of the South. 
 61. See Deborah Z. Cass, Brett G. Williams & George Barker, Introduction, in THE WORLD 
TRADING SYSTEM 1 (2003) (describing China’s hybridization of Marxism and free-market principles). 
 62. See Eorsi, supra note 60, at 346–56 (stating that because there are so many dimensions of 
compromise, there is no meaningful line for a continuum). 
 63. See DiMatteo, supra note 20, at 78 (describing the CISG as containing a hybrid of Civil, 
Socialist and Common Law systems of contract). 
 64. Kennedy, supra note 12. 
 65. Id. at 1766 (“Indeed, I hope I have shown that the dimension of rules vs. standards is no more 
than a fourth instance of the altruist-individualist conflict of community vs. autonomy, regulation vs. 
facilitation and paternalism vs. self-determination.”). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1735–36. 
 69. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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“controversies not covered or ambiguously covered by the parties,”70 the 
subject of the cases examined here, are pervasive. Finally, between 
“paternalism vs. self-determination,”71 mistake is generally limited within the 
CISG,72 but “reasonableness,” again, is pervasive. The structure of the 
Convention thus does not come out on one side or the other of any of these 
dimensions.  
Given the broad use of “reasonableness” and the criteria of article 8 for 
interpreting intent, the CISG is, with few exceptions, firmly on the side of 
“standards” rather than “rules.”73 This may be a question of interpretive 
flexibility, given the difficulty of amending an international convention,74 or 
it may be a political and legal theory phenomenon intended to guide 
interpretation of the Convention.75 
Professor Kennedy argued that altruism had chipped away at 
individualism without developing any logical or intuitive appeal as an overall 
system for organizing society.76 I suggest that the current world situation is 
just such a reconciled system, a system in which the advances of political 
science and economics have established a regulated market of institutions 
and recognized that markets may fail.77 
That the CISG was a compromise among legal and economic systems 
raises a puzzle. How should we regard the development of CISG case law?  
It will be seen that the CISG is a law of markets and regulation—a unified 
picture going forward—that steps out of the paradigms of conflict along 
spectrums. The Convention thus adopts a flexible structure that allows for 
interpretation in light of whatever type of social-political-economic system is 
prevalent at the time. Article 8(3) does not mandate any particular 
worldview; a regulated market emerges as the paradigm that fits the world 
surrounding the CISG.  
The markets envisioned are not idealized, efficient, perfectly informed, 
and perfectly competitive; rather, they are the markets of the “real world.”78  
 70. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1734. 
 71. Id. at 1736–37. 
 72. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 79 (containing limited provisions on exemptions). 
 73. See supra Parts II.A.2 and II.C.1. 
 74. See HONNOLD, supra note 9, § 18 (stating that a statute or code must be short and general in 
order to have longevity). 
 75. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 76. See Kennedy, supra note 12. “[A]ltruism has not emerged as a comprehensive rational 
counter theory able to accomplish the task which has defeated its adversary.” Id. at 1766. 
 77. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 78. Cf. David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract 
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1820–21 (1991) (creating a matrix with four spaces for 
evaluating the application of market principles to “hypothetical bargains”). See infra Parts IV and V 
regarding real world markets. 
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The late Professor Charny offered two spectra for assessing market 
arguments regarding “hypothetical bargains”: “generalized vs. particular” 
and “idealized vs. real-world.”79 The CISG cases, it will be seen, use “real-
world” markets. Sometimes the markets are “particular”—for instance, an 
inquiry into the article 8(2) intent of transactors.80 Sometimes, the markets 
are “generalized,” in the sense of traders generally. Extensive inquiries into 
the nature of and knowledge base of traders are rare. All of this is described 
in Part IV. 
In Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract 
Interpretation, Professor Charny reconciled the poles of his spectra by 
offering a mechanism for dispute resolution that focused on whether parties 
could bargain around rules set forth by the courts of the United States, which 
operate under a common law, precedential system.81 
The function of standards, as opposed to rules, refocuses this method for 
the CISG, where decisions are considered authority, though arguably not 
even precedent within the United States.82 Rather than asking parties to 
bargain around rules set forth by the courts, the CISG decisions call issues to 
the attention of traders, such as the speed of a tram,83 or the life span of a 
display globe.84  
Parties do not have to bargain around these decisions. In fact, the 
decisions are extremely fact-specific. They are decisions of law only because 
of the operation of article 8(3), which brings many observations about the 
world into the “law.” This is possible because of the flexible nature of the 
prior decisions’ authority: they do not serve as precedent. Rather, these 
decisions call issues to the attention of traders, though the trader who wishes 
to rely on the court for a fair decision may choose to preserve a trading 
relationship without addressing these issues. It may be more congenial not to 
address issues that seem obvious to the trader.  
Thus, the reason for complex and lengthy contracts in the United States 
may be not the jury system, as Professor Charny suggested;85 rather, the 
reason might be the use of rules and precedent to secure decisions. After all, 
 79. See id. (setting forth four possible outcomes of the four approaches to hypothetical 
bargaining).  
 80. See Van Alstine, supra note 7, at 44 (“[T]his form of objective interpretation does not impose 
a normative resolution.”); see also id. at 60 (elaborating an objective standard for article 8). 
 81. See Charny, supra note 78, at 1877–79 (exploring use of bargaining around decisions for 
parties who will or will not bargain around the rules).  
 82. See Hackney, supra note 23, at 484 (considering whether case law under the CISG should 
ever be binding precedent). 
 83. See infra notes 140–47 and accompanying text.  
 84. See infra notes 156–58 and accompanying text.  
 85. See Charny, supra note 78, at n.24. 
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someone else’s case decided a few months earlier might secure an undesired 
rule that the U.S. trader seeks to avoid. 
In this sense, legal standards, suitability, and CISG quality apply the 
CISG’s text and institutions in a new “situation.” Duncan Kennedy’s article 
regarding altruism and individualism termed the judge as a “person-in-
situation,”86 which also happens to be a social work term of a vintage a few 
years prior to his 1976 article.87 What can be learned about rules, standards, 
the market, and the CISG from applying social work analysis to these 
questions? 
3. CISG Quality “In Situation”: Markets of Imperfect Information and 
Regulation 
Rules and standards interact in an environment, or “situation,” of the 
international trade deal. Quality is decided through standards that rely on 
rules, which in turn rely on standards. What then is the “situation” in which 
the market operates? 
First, consider the decision to apply market standards, a binary decision. 
What environment does the tribunal find if it decides to apply market 
principles? The answer is a globalized market, in which western goods, 
trademarks, and styles are apparent.88 Thus, the economic, social, and 
political environment in which traders find themselves is largely, but not 
entirely, a market organized “situation.” The market recognized by the CISG, 
however, is not a market organized in terms of efficiency and idealized, 
perfect information. Rather, it is a market of imperfect information, of 
institutions, and market failure;89 in short, the late Professor Charny’s “real-
world” markets.90 The social work “situation” is just such an economic, 
social, and political milieu.91 It can even be diagrammed to represent the 
 86. See Kennedy, supra note 12.  
[Altruism] asserts that we can gain an understanding of the values people have woven into their 
particular relationships, and of the moral tendency of their acts. These sometimes permit the judge 
to reach a decision, after the fact, on the basis of all the circumstances. . . . 
Id. at 1773 (emphasis added). 
 87. For a discussion using the phrase “person in situation” prior to 1976, see generally BEULAH 
R. COMPTON & BURT GALAWAY, SOCIAL WORK PROCESSES 3–4 (6th ed. 1999). 
 88. See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, Erewhon: The Coming Global Legal Order, 37 STAN. 
J. INT’L L. 347 (2001) (discussing the spread of U.S. brands and the growing international market). 
 89. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 90. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 91. See COMPTON & GALAWAY, supra note 87, at 28–34 (describing a shift from cause and 
effect to person and situation, forming an integrated whole); K. ASHMAN & GRAFTON H. HULL, JR., 
UNDERSTANDING GENERALIST PRACTICE 14–15 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing terms, including: social 
environments, the person-in-environment concept, adaptation, and coping). 
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social worker as analogous to the judge or arbitrator, the lawyers, and the 
resources such as businesses, organizations, and materials—that 
communities can bring to bear on a particular issue.92 Drawing an analogy 
between social work and business law highlights the experiences of a related 
discipline that must also face decisions about real world problems without 
certainty.93  
Thus, looking at the international trade situation from the perspective of 
the social work “situation,” the CISG’s success in problematic, unclear 
quality cases may simply be because the CISG is developing standards and 
rules that are suited to the market “situation.”94 Or, it may be that the CISG 
structure is sufficiently open to one or another form of societal organization; 
in other words, its success may be due to the fact that more than one type of 
economic organization may be applied under the terms of the Convention’s 
structure. 
The advantage of the social work person-in-situation approach is that it 
calls upon the worker, or here, the legal author, to look at and observe the 
situation surrounding the relevant party, here, the international trader, rather 
than approach the situation with a preconceived theoretical framework.95 
This calls for an approach that observes the cases and the world situation.  
Finally, there is the question of whether the “fit” between the cases and 
the world situation is close. If it is close, the other workers—the deciding 
tribunals—have done their work well. For if the goal of the CISG is, broadly 
speaking, to facilitate international trade, then this goal will only be served if 
the Convention is applied in a manner that “fits” the world around it. 96  
This is not to say that the general norms or behaviors of traders are 
viewed as the norms that should be enforced by the Convention.97 Rather, I 
 92. See generally MARK A. MATTAINI, MORE THAN A THOUSAND WORDS: GRAPHICS FOR 
CLINICAL PRACTICE (1993) (illustrating various diagrams intended specifically for the field of clinical 
social work); THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE: A GRADUATE TEXT 24–26 (Carol H. 
Meyer & Mark A. Mattaini eds., 1995) (describing the resources available for children within a 
neighborhood, including business resources backing sports teams). 
 93. See COMPTON & GALAWAY, supra note 87, at 54 (discussing the process of coping with 
uncertainty). 
 94. See BRADFORD W. SHEAFOR ET AL., TECHNIQUES AND GUIDELINES FOR SOCIAL WORK 
PRACTICE 91–92 (5th ed. 2000) (stating that niche and adaptation are critical to the client); 
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE, supra note 92, at 20–26 (describing a social construction 
of reality and processes that bind people); Competence-Oriented Social Work Practice: An Ecological 
Approach, in PROMOTING COMPETENCE IN CLIENTS: A NEW/OLD APPROACH TO SOCIAL WORK 
PRACTICE 7–19, 46–52 (Anthony N. Maluccio ed., 1981) (noting the client’s need to fit with their 
environment). 
 95. The social work sources cited supra at notes 91–94 are based on observations of the situation 
and draw out what is seen; they are not applying preconceived theories. 
 96. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
 97. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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argue that the CISG fits the social-political-economic world in which it is 
applied today, and could fit the world as it will appear tomorrow were the 
world’s organizing structure to change. By fitting the “situation,” the CISG 
allows the circumstances in which it finds itself to show through its structure, 
primarily through the open nature of article 8(3) and the extensive use of 
standards, rather than rules, for interpretation.  
The current world situation appears through the CISG to be a market 
tempered by concerns of equity and regulation,98 roughly in line with our 
general understandings of the current organization of the world’s 
economies.99  
The suitability of the CISG’s market-oriented jurisprudence may account 
for the high level of uniformity seen in the decisions. Thus, fitting the 
situation is largely due to the market as it exists, rather than being due to the 
overcoming of ethnocentricity with regard to particular parties.100 This may 
account for the high percentage of decisions that come from Western Europe 
and the United States.101 Some authors have argued that Western Europe’s 
higher percentage is due to its prior experience with international trade 
law,102 though this may be too simple an explanation.  
The CISG decisions’ international character may be accounted for by the 
CISG’s suitability to the “situation.” The market is globalized, and it is 
possible to make “autonomous” decisions—that is, without reference to 
domestic law,103 but perhaps with reference to market considerations under 
the CISG quality decisions. 
The objective of good faith in interpretation can also be achieved through 
market suitability to the “situation.” A version of good faith in negotiations is 
achieved under article 8(2) by construing ambiguities against the message 
sender.104 Thus, the traders know that they need to communicate clearly 
during their transactions. This limited version of good faith in negotiations 
thus provides structure to interactions governed by the Convention. 
 98. See infra Part IV.  
 99. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 100. See Kastely, supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also V. Susanne Cook, The U.N. 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A Mandate to Abandon Legal 
Ethnocentricity, 16 J.L. & COM. 257, 261 (1997).  
 101. See John O. Honnold, The Sales Convention: From Idea to Practice, 17 J.L. & COM. 181, 
183 (1998). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (stating that the CISG is designed for autonomous 
decisions under its own terms, with reference to domestic law only in matters not covered by the 
CISG). 
 104. Schlechtriem, supra note 19, at 72 (“Article 8(2) [takes] into account good faith and 
prevailing practice . . . in conformity with article 7(1)”). 
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4. Advancing International Trade 
Do these three factors—uniformity, international character, and good 
faith—promote the fourth objective of advancing international trade? Given 
the regulated market’s wide acceptance, the answer is, probably yes. With 
uniform, autonomous decisions, some limited version of good faith, and 
reliance on some source of a widely accepted applicable market, CISG 
jurisprudence is poised to foster international trade, building upon the 
growing globalization of the world economy.105 That is not a normative 
statement, or a prediction that this condition will continue. Rather, this is a 
description that employs the interpretive techniques of scholars from the 
perspectives of altruism, globalization, and the CISG by using law and a 
framework drawn from the “situation” of social work. 
The cases discussed herein will shed light on just what sort of market is 
envisioned by the CISG jurisprudence. 
III. FRAMEWORK FOR CASE LAW ON OBJECTIVE INTENT IN QUALITY 
CASES 
A. Study of the “Market” Emerged from the Cases, Not Preconceived 
Theories, Due to “Situation” Analysis 
Using the “situation” analysis of studying what is seen, not preconceived 
theories,106 the “market” emerged from the cases as the critical unit of 
analysis. In preparing this Article, the market was not initially sought out as 
an expected phenomenon in the cases. Rather, it emerged from looking at the 
facts of the cases. Thus, the “situation” of a legal author examining the facts 
of the case allowed the market to emerge as an entity for study. 
B. The CISG Sources 
The cases analyzed here are drawn primarily from the Pace University 
Law School Electronic Library on International Trade Law and the CISG, an 
Internet database.107 This database contains over 1200 cases, thousands of 
abstracts, and many secondary sources. The Pace database has a large 
number of translations into English and overlaps to some extent with other 
CISG databases.108 This Article discusses approximately twenty cases, a 
 105. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 106. See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text for a discussion of social work methodology. 
 107. CISG Database, supra note 2. 
 108. See, e.g., the Steel Billets arbitration by the Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber 
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number that suffices to analyze in legal, not statistical, methodology, a very 
discrete issue.  
The criteria for choosing decisions was as follows. First, the article 35 
cases and reports of arbitrations were selected. Approximately 185 article 35 
cases were present at the time research was conducted.109 The twenty 
decisions discussed herein were selected on the basis of quality being the 
central issue, without significant attention in the case to notice and other 
issues that were available to form the basis of decision. Thus, the quality 
issues were central and formed the dispositive holdings of the cases. 
Choosing decisions required some amount of lawyer’s judgment. Arbitral 
decisions are included because the point of analyzing the decisions is not 
precedent but rather guidance for future decisions. In general, full text 
decisions or substantial extracts were relied on, and abstracts were not used, 
except as noted.  
What then, was the analytical framework for looking at these decisions? 
C. Interplay of Facts, Objective Intent Reasoning and Legal Provisions 
Regarding Quality 
The framework for analyzing the decisions consisted of looking at 
archetypal facts, objective intent reasoning, and legal provisions regarding 
quality. Archetypal facts here include: manufacturing processes; the markets 
for specific purposes and for goods; the feasibility of using experts; the 
expertise of the buyer; and the market needs for health or other regulation. 
Archetypal facts are chosen by examining the “situation” to see what 
economic, social, and political factors are present and how they interact.  
Characteristics of the Pace database suggested a focus on facts rather than 
default rules within each article. The database does not categorize decisions 
in the same manner as Westlaw or LexisNexis. I concluded that it was better 
to use “brute force” and look at all the cases indexed under article 35 rather 
than to attempt a keyword search. This facilitated looking at facts rather than 
rules within each article.  
Careful inspection shows that archetypal facts are also generally critical to 
a decision concerning the standards for quality. The characteristic that links 
the key archetypal facts with the article 35 quality standards is objective 
 
 
of Commerce [hereinafter ICC], digested by Albert H. Kritzer (Executive Secretary of the Pace 
database), who organizes the database, in the Pace Database and reproduced more fully by the Unilex 
database. These sources are available, respectively, at http://cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/958213il.html 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2004), and http://www.unilex.info/case/cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=520&step= 
FullText (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).  
 109. CISG Database, supra note 2. 
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intent reasoning. The objective intent reasoning under article 8(3) links the 
archetypal facts with the standards for quality. As will be seen, the primary 
link under article 8(3) is the concept of the market. 
D. Interplay of Archetypal Facts and Legal Rules: Not an Exclusive 
Association 
Decisions are grouped according to the standard—such as a warranty for 
merchantability—that governed the decision in formal terms, except for the 
health and conformity decisions, which are grouped separately at the end of 
Part IV. These decisions are built around a rule within the article 35 
provisions for dealing with regulation in the buyer’s country.110 Notable 
arguments on article 35 grounds that were rejected are discussed. Arguments 
on article 8 grounds that influenced the decision, whether explicitly 
referenced as article 8 arguments or not, are highlighted.  
The decisions show that facts, combined with the article 8 series of 
standards, such as the market, are the driving factors that make the decisions 
consistent or inconsistent. Under the article 35 standards, cases can go either 
way. In combination with the article 8 factors, however, in the form of 
archetypal facts, the cases are consistent.  
The “market” archetypal facts thus are not limited to merchantability and 
a warranty of fitness for ordinary use. The market archetypal facts influence 
different categories of legal rules, even as to specifications. This was 
discovered through application of the social work aspect of “situation” 
analysis, of looking at the facts without preconceived theories, and was 
facilitated by the Pace database construction, without the rigid categories of 
United States case digests. 
Part IV is not about whether the default rules developed under article 35 
are consistent. Rather, Part IV is about whether the decisions are consistent 
with the archetypal facts that are discussed in the decisions. As such, the 
decisions are about the implementation of standards under articles 35 and 8, 
not about the formation of additional rules.  
 110. See DiMatteo et al., supra note 8, at 432 for a discussion regarding the importance of default 
rules within the provisions of article 35. 
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IV. QUALITY STANDARDS AND SYSTEMATIC ASSOCIATIONS OF INTENT 
RULES 
A. Manufacturing and Specifications: Communications and the Market 
Inquiry under article 35 begins with paragraph (1), which deals with 
whether an agreement under the contract governs the issue. The first four 
cases considered address the issue of specifications in a straight-forward 
communications situation. 
It is useful to consider first a case in which communication under article 
8(2), along with the circumstances of the machinery and the nature of the 
buyer’s expertise under the standards of article 8(3), was the reason for 
decision. In the Used Textile Machine case, the buyer was deemed to have 
agreed to the specifications, according to article 8(2), because of 
circumstances regarding the machinery, the buyer’s expertise and inspection, 
and the material nature of the machine.111 It was an argument of 
specifications versus specifications, with an emphasis on agreement, 
manufacturing processes and the nature of the buyer’s expertise. It is similar 
to Professor Kastely’s arguments about recognizing differences, though it is 
not developed along the same lines.112 The seller came from Switzerland and 
the buyer from Germany. The buyer lost and, indeed, other cases will show a 
tendency for the buyer to lose when the argument becomes a case of the 
specifications versus the specifications or a case of a market tempered by 
equity.113  
A second decision in which communication was the determinative issue 
considered the role of agreement to specifications versus warranty issues, 
where the practice of the parties was used to show that there was no industry 
standard.114 In the Steel Billets arbitration, the lack of agreement regarding 
use of steel billets defeated the warranty issue.115 The agreement as to 
specifications reigned. Here, there was no issue as to the market for the 
 111. Entscheidung des Schweizerisches Bundesgerichts [BGE], available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/001222s1.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2004) [hereinafter BGer. 
Switzerland]. The Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland addresses an international contract law issue 
in this case. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See infra notes 126–35 and accompanying text.  
 114. Steel Billets arbitration, supra note 108. The digest, by Professor Kritzer at Pace, is 
particularly full and raises many issues. For that reason, I searched outside the Pace database to Unilex 
to obtain the full text of the decision. The arbitration looks at both the CISG, as Swiss law, governing 
part of the transaction, and the New Jersey Uniform Commercial Code, governing another part of the 
transaction. The two laws are compared. The arbitral tribunal and the ICC thoroughly analyzed these 
transactions.  
 115. Steel Billet arbitration, supra note 108. 
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specific uses. There was no reason the generally stated use for a particular 
purpose could not succeed;116 thus, the buyer lost. The specifications, with an 
emphasis on agreement, triumphed.117  
In the Sheep case, testimony was used again to bolster the specifications 
argument.118 The buyer complained that the sheep were “too raw boned,” 
needing to be fattened up.119 The court attached great weight to the testimony 
of an employee whose job was to fatten up the sheep for the buyer.120 Thus, 
the buyer’s claim that the sheep were to be mature enough to be slaughtered 
when purchased was defeated.121 The buyer lost on a specifications versus 
specifications issue.  
Specifications can also be addressed through samples, for which a 
separate CISG provision, article 35(2)(c) applies. In the Canned Fruit 
arbitration, the buyer prevailed in a dispute over a sample.122 Non-conformity 
of the sample meant the buyer won, despite the evidence contained in the 
agreement supporting the opposite conclusion. The tribunal addressed 
whether either the cans holding the fruit or the boxes containing the cans was 
responsible for the lack of conformity.123 The tribunal blamed the problems 
on the faulty cans, not the faulty boxes.124 Thus, the problems were attributed 
to non-conforming cans, for which there was no appropriate sample.125 This 
case also illustrates the application of article 35(2)(d) regarding packaging. 
 116. Id. § D, paras. 7, 9. The identity of the end-customers was intentionally kept from the 
supplier for commercial reasons, so problems with rolling the steel billets at that customer’s site were 
unknown to the seller. This had been the course of dealing of the parties. As such, it was a course of 
dealing issue, not a market issue pertaining to the needs of end-users. Rather, the issue was whether 
end-users came into play in the decision at all. Cf. infra notes 130–31 and accompanying text 
(regarding retail end users and the market). 
 117. Steel Billet arbitration, supra note 108, § c. For the counterclaim, the burden was on the 
seller. Id. 
 118. OLG Schleswig, 11U40/01 (2002), at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/020822g2.html 
(last visited Sept. 20, 2004). After the specifications discussion, the court went on to consider a 
warranty issue, which was dismissed on notice grounds. Id. 
 119. Id. § 2, para. 2. 
 120. Id. “Since the witness D was on duty to fatten up the sheep and was already informed about 
this duty before the actual delivery of the sheep, it seems to be almost impossible that the [buyer] 
ordered 400 sheep, mature to be slaughtered immediately.” Id. § 4, para. 5. 
 121. Id. § 4, para 5. 
 122. Compromex, M/21/95 (1996), reprinted in 17 J.L. & COM. 427–43 (1998), available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/960429m1.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2004). See also Alejondro 
M. Garro, The U.N. Sales Convention in the Americas: Recent Developments, 17 J.L. & COM. 219, 
222–33 (1998) (discussing packaging standards and need in maritime transit). 
 123. Compromex, M/21/95, supra note 122, at 438–40. 
 124. Id. at 440. 
 125. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss1/2
p  1 Charters book pages.doc2/14/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] THE CISG AND THE REGULATED MARKET 27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, where communications, including samples, were issues, sellers won 
three out of four times. The next case involved specifications bolstered by the 
circumstances of the production process. 
In the Clothes Dye case, in the Appellate Court of Barcelona, Spain, an 
agreement regarding specifications was bolstered by the circumstances of the 
production process and defeated an argument regarding the particular 
purpose and a possible hidden defect.126 Again, the buyer lost. The emphasis 
was on the circumstances of manufacturing, not the agreement. A hidden 
defects argument was rejected127 due to the importance of the production 
process.128  
Thus, in the first five cases, we can observe that no market information 
was relied upon as the reason for decision. It was communication versus 
either communication alone, or communication and the production process. 
In all but one case, the seller won.  
In sharp contrast, in the following two cases, the buyer won. The 
decisions’ formal issue was specifications, but the decisions involved fact 
patterns influenced by market issues.  
Market information can be used to bolster specifications arguments. In the 
Sports Clothes case, market information was used to support the 
specifications argument used to decide the case.129 The goods were non-
conforming because they did not meet the size requirements when washed, 
which could be a major detriment to the retailers as the end customers would 
“no longer buy goods from this retailer.”130 The retail end consumers were 
not satisfied with the goods because the goods would shrink excessively 
when washed.131 This was an unusual case in which the buyer won on a 
 126. STS, TranspR-IHR 26–27, 755/95-C (1997), at http://cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
970620s4.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).  
 127. Id. § III, para. 4. 
 128. Id.  
The use of expert evidence on that would add nothing to the resolution of this case. The 
merchandise supplied by [seller] only constitutes part of [buyer’s] production process. That 
merchandise is the ink that, with heat, is printed on the fabric supplied by other parties. The final 
product depends on the fabric base, the atmospheric and conservation conditions, the printing 
temperature, etc. It is, therefore, difficult to see how any examination of the resulting fabric, could 
show the origin of the defect. 
Id. § III. 
 129. LG Landshut 54 O 644/94 (1995), at http://cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/950405g1.html (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2004).  
 130. Id. § II(1)(b). “The [seller] had to deliver goods of the quality and description required by the 
contract. By delivering goods that shrank by 10–15%, i.e., one to two sizes, the [seller] has breached 
its contractual obligations.” Id. § II(1)(b) (alterations in original). 
 131. Id. (emphasis added) “[T]he end customer could no longer wear these clothes after having 
washed them for the first time. The end customer, thus, would either complain to the retailer or would 
no longer buy goods from this retailer. Thereby, the retailer suffers a substantial detriment.” Id. 
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specifications issue, but only because the buyer also had a very strong market 
argument.  
In Delchi Carrier v. Rotorex Corporation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit decided a case for breach of an agreement and relied on 
evidence contained in letters of the seller’s executives.132 The letters 
contained admissions that the cooling power and energy efficiency of air-
conditioner compressors—critical technical factors bearing on the market 
viability of the compressors—did not meet the contractual standards.133 This 
decision, though criticized for other reasons,134 was highly influenced by 
market information pertaining to the promised specifications regarding the 
“value” of the compressors.135 The court relied on the agreement and its 
specifications.136  
Thus, these cases go either way based on the presence or absence of 
certain archetypal facts. These facts are mediated through the principles 
found in article 8(3).137 A straight challenge of specifications versus 
specifications will tend to favor the seller.138 Manufacturing information will 
also generally help the seller.139 In the Sports Clothes and Delchi Carrier 
cases, however, the market supported the specification arguments and the 
buyer won.  
B. Use and Particular Purpose: Communications and the Market, Redeux 
A warranty for a specific purpose is, like a specification, an issue 
concerning statements. The cases are about what has been agreed to, with 
market information being admitted in some cases. This is illustrated by the 
Tram case.140 
Deciding to include market analysis is a decision to include the rhetoric of 
the market. This is not, however, the market of efficiency. It is the market of 
 132. Delchi Carrier v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1029 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 133. See id. at 1028 (discussing the letters from Ernest Gamache, dated May 13, 1988, and John 
McFee, dated May 17, 1988, prior to the May 23, 1988 cancellation of the contract by the buyer). 
 134. Cook, supra note 100, at 261 (criticizing the court’s reference to sparse U.S. case law on the 
CISG, when, at a minimum, extensive foreign case law is available). 
 135. Delchi Carrier, 71 F.3d at 1029. “[T]he cooling power and energy consumption of an air 
conditioner compressor are important determinants of the product’s value . . . .” 
 136. Id. 
 137. CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(3). 
 138. See, e.g., Steel Billets, supra note 108; BGer. Switzerland, 4C 296 (2000), supra note 111. 
 139. See, e.g., STS, Transp. R-IHR 26–27, 755/95-C (1997), supra note 126. 
 140. Rechtbank van Koophandel of Veurne, Belgium, A/00/00665 (Apr. 25, 2001), at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/010425b1.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2004). A hidden defect claim 
was also rejected. Id. 
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the “real world.”141 These are not normative statements. Scholars and 
practitioners of any political persuasion would like to know how the rhetoric 
and analysis of the market appears in these cases. To recognize the market 
employed in the cases is to be able to push for more, less, or the same and to 
be able to use a similar analysis strategically. 
In the Tram case, the buyer was left without recourse when market 
arguments filled gaps in the agreement where communication between the 
parties failed.142 There were no relevant specifications and no discussion of 
use for a particular purpose. The buyer lost, because the buyer failed to 
provide any specifications about the tram’s speed, and the court found that 
both the tram’s ordinary and specific purpose was to serve as a “small tourist 
tram” that could travel at a speed of about twenty-five kilometers per hour.143 
Articles 35(2)(a) and 35(b) were cited by the court with regard to the 
ordinary and specific purposes, respectively.144 During litigation, the buyer 
claimed he had demanded a speed of forty kilometers per hour. Here, the 
absence of a contractual statement by the buyer was construed against the 
buyer. Although uncited by the court, this was an application of article 8(2). 
The only relevant requirement was that the tram be a “small tourist tram.”145 
This specification was met, in the court’s view, even at the slower speed.146 
In the absence of a statement to protect the buyer, market information about 
the nature of the tourist tram industry, the use for “promotional purposes,” 
was used to show that the slower speed was adequate for the purposes for 
which the tram was generally intended.147 Thus, the market was used to 
support the argument in favor of the seller.  
The Sheepskin case involved leather that was supposed to conform with a 
sample and was to be fit for the particular purpose of being dyed by the 
buyer’s customers and used as furniture covering.148 The market argument 
here was that the customers would use the sheepskin by dying it. It was left 
up to the seller to prove that its goods conformed to the sample. The parties 
called an expert to determine whether the leather could be used for the stated 
 141. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 142. Rechtbank van Koophandel of Veurne, Belgium, A/00/00665 (2001), supra note 140. 
 143. Id. at 6. “Since the ‘diesel tram’ actually appears to be a small tourist train, and as such is 
used by the [buyer] for promotional purposes (cf. [seller]’s brief, exhibit no. 24), a speed of 25 km per 
hour is not incompatible with the ‘ordinary use’ and/or the ‘particular purpose’ mentioned in Articles 
35(2)(a) and (b) CISG.” Id. 
 144. Id. at 6. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. 
 148. RB Rotterdam, HA2A 98-1405 (1999), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
991014nl.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2004). 
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purpose.149 The seller provided an expert who testified about the products’ 
suitability for a particular use.150 Because the expert offered no testimony 
about the delivered products’ conformity to the sample, however, the court 
held the expert’s testimony was insufficient.151 In the end, this case was not 
resolved in either party’s favor. 
Market information bolstered the decision of the Fourth Circuit in 
Schmitz-Werke GmbH & Co. v. Rockland Industries, Inc., where the buyer 
communicated the need for goods suitable for a particular purpose.152 The 
trial court had held that there was an express warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose and that there were latent defects in the cloth delivered by 
the seller, making it inadequate for the particular purpose of transfer 
printing.153 The Fourth Circuit did not rely on a hidden defect analysis and 
instead relied on information about the process of transfer printing. The 
cloth’s suitability for the particular purpose was adequate and the court held 
that specific details about defects in the cloth, which might hinder the 
printing process, were irrelevant.154 The court concluded that the buyer 
continued to use the product in the transfer printing process to mitigate its 
damages, not that the buyer admitted to the cloth’s adequate quality.155 
Again, market information, here the ability of the buyer to mitigate damages 
by selling to customers, informed the court’s decision in a case involving a 
product’s disputed suitability for a particular purpose. This time, the buyer 
won. 
The Globe case, which dealt with showroom display globes, shows again 
a reference to the market.156 It was “made crystal clear and recognizable” that 
“these expensive and sophisticated exhibits” would be used for more than 
just “a few months.”157 “[T]he Court assumes an impliedly agreed 
operational lifetime of the globes of three years on average.”158 The court’s 
 149. Id. § 7.7. This is not a hidden defects case. Damage or faulty product were not alleged. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. “The court encourage[d] the parties to arrange, by common agreement, an independent 
expertise to be made in order to facilitate the legal proceedings.” Id. 
 152. Schmitz-Werke GMBH v. Rockland Industries, Inc., 37 Fed. App. 687, 690 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 153. Id. at 690. “The court also found that the Trevira fabric sold by Rockland had latent defects 
. . .” Id. 
 154. Id. at 693. “[I]t just permits Schmitz to do so without proving the exact nature of the defect.” 
Id. 
 155. Id. at 690. “Schmitz’ continued printing of the fabric even after it began to discover problems 
was reasonable since it was at the express urging of Rockland and was in any event the best way to 
mitigate its damages.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 156. LG Munchen, 5 HKO 3936/00 (2002), at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
020227g1.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).  
 157. Id. at 6. 
 158. Id. at 6–7. 
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rhetoric describes exactly the opposite of an idealized market because it 
“assumes” three years. In this real world market, there is no perfect 
information, and as a result, the court is forced to make an assumption. Thus, 
the expense of the globes figured into their expected lifetime in the court’s 
eyes, raising a market argument, and the buyer won. 
In a 1996 Russian arbitration, the market was not included to bolster the 
communication argument.159 The arbitration involved unknown goods.160 
The Russian seller “could not have been unaware of the climatic conditions 
of use of the goods” when delivering to Ecuador.161 Thus, the climate was 
regarded as general, widely available information. Depending on the type of 
goods, the exact temperature, rather than the general climate, might or might 
not have been relevant. Because we do not know the type of goods, it is 
impossible to say whether the general Ecuadoran climate is sufficient 
information on which to base specifications for the goods. Because the 
tribunal considered the climate to be sufficient, and because there is no 
evidence in the record of any contrary indication, the information about the 
climate must have been dispositive.  
It is compelling to note that this Russian decision did not rely on market 
arguments, such as the feasibility of using the goods in Ecuador for economic 
gain. By neglecting market arguments, which were obvious, the tribunal 
limited the power of the market.  
This sub-part is sub-titled “Communications and the Market, Redeux” 
because the claim of a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is parallel 
to that of a specification. The claim requires a buyer to communicate clearly 
to the seller exactly what the buyer wants. The claims are therefore 
susceptible to, and are decided under, article 8(2)’s rule of constructing 
ambiguities against the speaker.162  
In three out of four cases that ended with a final decision, the buyer won 
because of the court or arbitral tribunal’s favorable decision with respect to 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. This win by the buyer is in sharp 
contrast with the specifications cases, particularly those cases without market 
arguments. Thus, it is advantageous for a buyer to make a claim of 
insuitability for a particular purpose. Claiming the suitability for use was part 
of the agreement will not always be possible, however, because the seller will 
 159. Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federation Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, 166/1995 (1996), at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/960312r1.html (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2004).  
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. § 1.4. 
 162. CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(2). See also supra Part II.C.1. 
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sometimes refuse the particular purpose. Where possible, the buyer will want 
to lay this groundwork. 
The fact that the Russian tribunal omitted the market information,163 
however, shows that tribunals are making a choice as to whether to include 
information about the market. When it is included, the market is referenced 
subtly. The Russian arbitration delimited the power of the market by omitting 
any reference to it. These are not, however, arguments about efficiency and 
distribution of resources through market mechanisms.164 Rather, these are 
arguments that reflect a world social-political-economic situation that only 
loosely embraces the market as a distributive mechanism. 
These cases suggest that market references, or the conspicuous lack 
thereof, reflect the world “situation.”165 The judge is not deciding in favor of 
any particular party, but rather the court is including rhetoric that is 
contemporary within that judge’s milieu. In this model, the trader is the 
“person-in-situation” and the judge and lawyers are analogous to “workers” 
who employ the prevalent text system within the institutional system to 
influence the “situational system,” of which the “person-in-situation” is a 
part. This is an application of the “situational” analysis of looking at the facts 
without preconceived theories. 
The effect on the use of standards, however, is profound. These tribunals 
all decide the cases pursuant to what is required under article 35. The cases 
are autonomously decided pursuant to the CISG, not domestic law. The 
decisions work side by side without citing each other, but follow along using 
primarily the same rhetorical approach of analyzing the market’s shading of 
the decisions. The fact that the decisions use this rhetoric is shown by its 
absence in the Russian arbitration. The decisions are all based on standards, 
which lack the precision and apparent control over the judge that is 
characteristic of rules.166 Contrary to what one would expect, however, it is in 
additional default rules that more conflict occurs.167 
 163. See supra note 159.  
 164. Cf. Charny, supra note 78, at 1820 (setting forth a four-space matrix for determining whether 
particularized, generalized, idealized, or realized forms of market analysis should be used for various 
types of cases); Clayton P. Gillette, The Law Merchant in the Modern Age: Institutional Design and 
International Usages under the CISG, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 157 (2004) (putting a premium on efficient 
adjudication); Avery Wiener Katz, The Relative Costs of Incorporating Trade Usage into Domestic 
Versus International Sales Contracts: Comments on Clayton Gillette, ‘Institutional Design and 
International Usages under the CISG’, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 181 (2004). 
 165. Cf. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1766 (regarding the judge “in-situation”). 
 166. See Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1765.  
On the formal level, there is eclecticism about when we should use rules and when standards. 
Sometimes it will be true that we can trust the judge to apply the purposes of the legal order 
directly to the particular facts, without worrying either about arbitrariness or about the 
inefficiencies generated by uncertainty. Sometimes, on the other hand, we will want him to 
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C. Markets and Merchantability: Triumph of the Market in Interpretation 
The warranty for ordinary use, also known as the warranty of 
“merchantability,” particularly brings forth market issues. This warranty does 
not depend on communication between the parties. It applies where no 
specification or warranty for a particular purpose governs. Thus, market 
issues, in these instances, are especially prevalent. 
The most recent of these cases is the New Zealand Housewares Case.168 
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the implied warranty of 
merchantability claim should be dismissed due to the presence of indemnity 
arrangements in the sale contract.169 The court did not cite article 8(3) but 
based its decision on the economic circumstances of the case, the course of 
dealing between the parties, the warranty provisions of the CISG, and the 
general legal provisions of many statutes in favor of implied warranties.170 
With regard to the economic circumstances of the case, the court held that 
under New Zealand law, this was “a good arguable case” and denied a 
motion to dismiss. The court had two reasons for its decision.171 First, the 
court rejected the defendant’s argument that the presence of indemnity 
provisions meant that there were no implied warranties.172 The court 
reasoned that, from both the buyer’s and seller’s point of view, an implied 
warranty of merchantability was objectively necessary because of the 
potential warranty claims by consumers or end-users.173 These economic 
arguments were supported with statements about the parties’ understanding 
of these economic realities; these statements were provided by both the 
buyer174 and the seller.175 
 
 
distinguish clearly between his lawmaking and law-applying roles. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 167. See infra Part IV.C (discussing whether the merchantability, average quality, or reasonable 
quality standard should be applied to the warranty for ordinary use). See generally DiMatteo et al., 
supra note 8 (arguing for more default rules under CISG articles and finding both consistent and 
inconsistent decisions). 
 168. NZ High Court, Auckland, CP 395 SD 01 (2003), at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ 
cases/030331n6.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2004).  
 169. Id. para. 52. The buyer had purchased light kitchen housewares appliances from seller, 
including toasters, deep fryers, food processors, kettles, irons, espresso machines and rice cookers, 
pursuant to distribution arrangements with the seller. Id. 
 170. Id. para. 59. This discussion invoked many national laws rather than New Zealand domestic 
law. Id. 
 171. Id. paras. 51, 78. 
 172. Id. para. 58. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. para. 58. 
It is clear that the plaintiff accepted that it was responsible for dealing with warranty claims which 
were raised by its customers . . . Indeed, the plaintiff may only have been prepared to accept sole 
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The court also reasoned that the course of dealing between the parties 
supported the argument for an implied warranty.176 The “situation” created 
by these “ad hoc arrangements” consisted of crediting an account and 
supplying new equipment.177 Again, the court did not cite article 8. The court 
further referenced the merchantability provision of the CISG, without 
specifically citing article 35, and referenced the prevalence of warranty of 
merchantability provisions in other laws.178 
Such market circumstances were also the foundation of the arbitral 
tribunal’s decision in the Rijn Blend arbitration.179 In this case an English 
buyer brought suit against a Netherlands seller of condensate crude oil mix, 
known as “Rijn Blend.”180 The Rijn Blend was a by-product from natural gas 
field exploration.181 The chemical composition of the Rijn Blend was not 
specified, and the tribunal determined that the specifications of the Rijn 
Blend were not sufficiently set forth to resolve the case.182 Moreover, an 
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose was not appropriate to 
this type of product because, if a particular purpose for this type of product 
was intended, then it should have been communicated and included in the 
contract’s specifications.183 
That left the arbitrators with an issue of quality under the CISG article 
35(2)(a) ordinary use provision. The tribunal discussed at length the 
legislative history of the CISG with regard to the “average quality” rule of 
civil law systems, the “merchantable quality” rule of English common law, 
and the “reasonable quality” rule of some commentators on the CISG.184 The 
tribunal emphasized the importance of the mercury level of the Rijn Blend, 
 
 
responsibility for warranty issues on the basis that it could be assured that the products which it 
was to receive would be of merchantable quality. 
Id. 
 175. Id. para. 60 
The material which has been placed before the Court makes it clear that the issue of faulty 
appliances was a matter of real concern to the defendants. Had they been asked at the outset 
whether they would be responsible for supplying products of merchantable quality, I have no 
doubt that they would have categorically affirmed that they were. 
Id. 
 176. Id. para. 58. 
 177. Id. para. 32. 
 178. Id. paras. 56–62. 
 179. Neth. Arb. Inst. 2319 (Oct. 15, 2002), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/021015n1.html 
(last visited Sept. 16, 2004); also available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id= 
836&step=FullText (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).  
 180. Id. para. 39. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. para. 62. 
 183. Id. para. 67. 
 184. Id. para. 68–72. 
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which would influence its market price.185 The tribunal found that the Rijn 
Blend was a “single purpose” commodity with no alternate market.186 Under 
the “merchantability” rule, the goods would be conforming if there were a 
substitute market.187 There was none. Under the “average quality” rule, the 
buyer failed to prove that the goods were below the average standard.188  
The tribunal chose to adopt the “reasonable quality” standard pursuant to 
article 7 of the CISG and found that market factors showed that the Rijn 
Blend failed the reasonable quality test.189  
Two market factors were of importance: the price and the long-term 
nature of the sales contracts. “[T]here was no market for Rijn Blend with 
increased mercury levels at prices comparable to the sales contracts when the 
increased levels were disclosed to prospective alternate buyers,” with respect 
to the merchantability test.190 This applied as well under the reasonable 
quality standard.191  
The ordinary use standard could be decided under one of the other tests. 
The Shoes Case was brought by an Italian seller against a German buyer in 
the District Court of Berlin.192 This was an early case under the CISG, 
decided in September, 1994. A sample was proffered by the seller, but the 
court held that the buyer had not agreed to it.193 The court applied the 
“average quality” standard and, referencing the common law merchantability 
rule, stated that it was insufficient that the goods “can only just be traded.”194 
The goods thus failed the market test of average quality; the buyer won. 
Thus, the market arguments did not overcome the presence of disparate 
additional rules under article 35. When the CISG had spawned additional 
rules under the standards of article 35, these rules constrained the tribunals 
and resulted in inconsistencies in the decisions. The market analysis could 
not overcome the presence of these additional rules. 
 185. Id. at para. 89. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. para. 99–102. 
 189. Id. para. 103–24. 
 190. Id. para. 89. 
 191. Id. In addition, the tribunal held that the long term nature of the contracts meant that the 
buyer was entitled to expect the initial, acceptable quality of the Rijn Blend. The tribunal found that a 
course of dealing had been established by the parties under article 8 and this course of dealing formed 
an important additional argument in this case. Id. para. 121. 
 192. LG Berlin, 52 S 247/94 (Sept. 15, 1994), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/940915g1.html 
(last visited Sept. 16, 2004). 
 193. Id. at 6. 
 194. Id. at 5.  
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The Cloth case juxtaposed language about the “economical” nature, or 
lack thereof, and the “usual” use of cloth195 with a conclusion that the fitness 
for ordinary use test had been met and that there was no agreement to a 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.196 The court’s rhetoric is striking, 
almost mocking the market nature of the fitness for ordinary use test; the 
cloth had to be cut on a diagonal, which meant that “the cloth could not be 
cut economically [as] . . . . [the diagonal cut] would have resulted in a waste 
of 122%, an amount that could not be considered economical.”197 Although 
the cloth would usually be cut front to back, “[u]ndisputedly, the fabric 
delivered by the [seller] is fit to be used for the production of skirts and 
dresses.”198 There was no warranty for a particular purpose either, as “[t]he 
[seller] was unable to infer from the circumstances that the [buyer] meant to 
cut the material in any particular way.”199  
Thus, market arguments were rejected by the court. One CISG 
commentator suggested that traders should examine inadequate price.200 This 
perspective could be regarded as the court acting as an equitable court that 
measured value as an integral part of its decision, rather than a market-driven 
court.201  
There is another side to this argument, however. Although the court 
accepted a market in which the quality may be low if it is not specified, the 
standard of good faith in negotiations is upheld through the application of the 
“infer from the circumstances” reference to article 8.202 If the buyer, who had 
not paid for the goods, intended to get a benefit from the delivery of below-
warranty goods without paying for them, this effort was foiled. Thus, the 
market requires some responsibility toward others, some requirement of 
altruism. This is decided in the case through the application of standards,203 
whether through equity or regulation of the market. 
 195. LG Regensburg, 6 O 107/98 (1998), at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/980924g1.html 
(last visited Sept. 13, 2004). The case also included issues of conformity to samples and of a hidden 
defect for which notice was deficient. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 5. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 3, at 279 § 2.8.3. The buyer should conclude that goods 
do not conform to convention standards if “the price corresponds to the price generally paid for poor 
quality goods.” Id. 
 201. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. 
REV. 917, 919 (1974). “Modern contract law was thus born staunchly proclaiming that all men are 
equal because all measures of inequality are illusory.” Id. 
 202. LG Regensburg, 6 O 107, para. 11 (1998), supra note 195. 
 203. See supra notes 64–71 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Kennedy’s four part 
dichotomy between individualism and altruism).  
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In these cases, the market is a central factor due to the parties’ diverging 
opinions regarding the agreement. The three standards available to decide 
fitness for ordinary use—merchantability, average quality, and reasonable 
quality—are avenues for some non-uniformity in the quality of goods cases. 
The Rijn Blend arbitration, a more recent decision employing the “reasonable 
quality” standards, may represent the wave of the future.204 
D. Health and Conformity: Two Themes 
The health and conformity cases have two themes: whether other 
jurisdictions’ cases are cited or tacitly acknowledged, and the power of the 
health concern for deciding cases. This will be seen in the contrast between 
the Mussels, Cheese and Paprika cases, and Medical Marketing 
International, Inc. v. Internazionale Medico Scientifica, S.R.L. on the one 
hand, and the Machines case on the other hand. 
In the famous Mussels case,205 the German Supreme Court set out a 
standard for deciding whether the regulations of the buyer’s country, 
particularly health regulations, were binding on the seller.206 The case was 
decided under articles 35(2)(a) and 35(2)(b) pertaining to warranties for 
ordinary use and for a particular purpose. The court used powerful rhetoric 
regarding the limitations on a duty:  
The delivered mussels are not of inferior quality even if their cadmium 
content exceeds the examination results known so far. The reason for 
this is that the standard for cadmium content in fish, in contrast to the 
standard for meat, does not have a legally binding character but only 
an administratively guiding character. Even if the standard is exceeded 
by more than 100%, one cannot assume that the food is no longer 
suitable for consumption, because mussels, contrary to basic food, are 
usually not consumed in large quantities within a short period of time 
and, therefore, even “peaks of contamination” are not harmful to one’s 
health.207  
 204. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 205. See Flechtner, 1998, supra note 17, at 209–10 (discussing the Mussels case); Teija Poikela, 
Conformity of Goods in the 1980 United Nations Convention of [sic] Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, 1 NORDIC J. COM. L. 1, 43, 54 n.129 (2003), at http://www.njd.fi/1__2003/article5.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2004) (addressing the famous Mussels case). 
 206. BGH2 Germany, VIII ZR 159/94 (Mar. 8, 1995), at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ 
cases/950308g3.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Mussels case].  
 207. Id. § I. 
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Thus, the court incorporated the consideration of supposed health effects 
as part of CISG jurisprudence, finding the regulations to be “administratively 
guiding.”208 The court then, however, made its language almost completely 
powerless by providing for many exceptions to the holding.  
The exceptions were far-reaching. The standards are not applicable: (1) if 
the seller has a branch in the buyer’s country; (2) if the seller has “already 
had a business connection with the buyer for some time;” or (3) if the seller 
often exports into the buyer’s country or has promoted products in that 
country.209 The court cited authorities and stated that the buyer had alleged 
no facts to support a finding that any of these exceptions should be found.210 
The court put the burden on the buyer, however, to inform the seller of 
regulations. The buyer lost. 
In the French Cheese case, the court made a decision that tightened a 
requirement imposed by the German Supreme Court without contradicting or 
citing the German court.211 The French court maneuvered around the prior 
decision in a manner that suggests that it knew about the German decision. 
The court found that: the seller had an ongoing business relationship with the 
buyer; that the seller knew the cheese would be marketed in France; that this 
knowledge imposed a duty on the seller under article 8(1) to interpret the 
order as pertaining to goods that have to comply with the marketing 
regulations of the French market; and that the seller had therefore delivered 
non-conforming goods.212  
This case goes a step beyond the Mussels case because the seller was 
charged with a duty to find out what the French regulations were, and 
because this duty was imported into the subjective agreement of the parties 
under article 8(1).213 There is no mention in the case that the seller knew the 
regulations. Thus, the regulations, at least in this case, are implied in the 
contract. The case is not contrary to the Mussels case, however, because the 
case does not say that the regulations in question are guidelines only, as does 
the Mussels case,214 and it states that there has been a business connection 
with the buyer for some time.215 Thus, the French precedent is not contrary to 
the German decision. Interpretation of the case under article 8(1) rather than 
 208. Id. § II(1)(bb). 
 209. Id. § II(1)(ccc). 
 210. Id.  
 211. CA Grenoble, Jurisclasseur Périodique (Paris) 1996, ed. 6, IV, 712, 927 93/4126(1995), at 
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/950913f1.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Cheese case]. 
 212. Id. §§ 2–3. 
 213. Id. § 3. 
 214. Mussels case, § II(1)(bb), supra note 206. 
 215. Cheese case, § 3, supra note 211. 
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article 8(2) is perhaps another way of being consistent with the German 
decision, as article 8(2) would better fit the objective nature of the inquiry.216 
The buyer won. 
For a French court to acknowledge a German decision as authority would, 
perhaps, put the French court in a position of providing undue 
acknowledgement of a foreign decision. Such acknowledgement of foreign 
decisions perhaps awaited further development of CISG law. This notion is 
expressed by a decision of the Italian Tribunale di Vigevano case described 
in the literature, which cited numerous foreign decisions.217  
That a foreign court’s decision is not cited does not undermine the 
decision’s usefulness in the jurisprudence of the CISG. Foreign cases can be 
cited as authority, rather than precedent. Naturally, they may also simply not 
be cited.218  
The Paprika case was decided by a lower German court a few months 
after the Mussels case.219 It, too, worked around its Supreme Court’s decision 
by finding a hidden defect and a need to require compliance with 
regulations.220 The hidden defect was addressed under the provisions of 
article 38 dealing with inspection of non-conformity.221 The buyer prevailed. 
Medical Marketing International, Inc. v. Internazionale Medico 
Scientifica, S.R.L., upheld an arbitral decision that, relying on the German 
court’s reasoning in the Mussels case, held that the seller was aware of the 
regulations governing the buyer before they entered into an agreement to 
supply radiological devices.222 The court used the German court’s reasoning 
and even cited the German decision.223 The U.S. court, unlike the earlier 
French court, was willing to cite a foreign case. It is important to note, 
however, that this was the Eastern District of Louisiana, a federal court 
sitting in a state with a long tradition of mixed legal traditions. 
 216. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 217. See Franco Ferrari, Tribunale di Vigevano: Specific Aspects of the CISG Uniformly Dealt 
With, 20 J.L. & COM. 225 (2001) (describing ground-breaking case). 
 218. See Franco Ferrari, CISG Case Law: A New Challenge for Interpreters?, 17 J.L. & COM. 
245, 260 (1998) (changing positions from that in Franco Ferrari, Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 
Uniform Sales Law, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 183 (1994)).  
 219. See LG Ellwangen, 1 KfH O 32/95 (Aug. 21, 1995), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ 
cases/950821g2.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).  
 220. Id. § III(B). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Medical Marketing Int’l, Inc. v. Internazionale Medico Scientifica, S.R.L., No. CIV.A.99-
0380, 1999 WL 311945 (E.D. La. May 17, 1999). 
 223. Id. n.2. 
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From a litigation perspective, a case will not have the same appeal if food 
or health concerns are not identified. This appeared to be true in the 2000 
Austrian Supreme Court Machines case.224 The dispute was between an 
Austrian buyer and German seller.225 The case was decided based on 
specifications. The regulations of the buyer’s country pertained to European 
Community labeling of the generic “machines.”226 No food or health effect 
was reported, and the parties had a history of providing the machines without 
the labeling.227 Thus, the course of dealing ran counter to the exception in the 
Mussels case for courses of dealing that show knowledge of the buyer’s 
country’s regulations. Thus, the legal argument about the course of dealing 
and the lack of food or health concerns makes this decision consistent with 
the Mussels case. 
In none of the cases involving quality and articles 8(2) and 8(3), even 
those involving regulation, do analogies or outside gap-filling come into play 
in determining the legal provisions applicable to the case. As Professors 
Flechtner and Schlechtriem have concluded, article 8 provides a self-
contained answer to many issues.228 It is not necessary to turn to analogy or 
outside gap-filling in the case discussed in their hypothetical, or in the 
decisions discussed here.  
Thus, this section makes evident two themes. These cases show, first, that 
health is a consideration that can mitigate against a lack of an agreement on a 
particular issue. Second, the Cheese case illustrates the principle that court 
decisions may converge consistently without actually citing each other. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We see, in conclusion, that market arguments emerge as the primary 
article 8(3) circumstance. The markets that are relevant are the markets of the 
real world, not markets of ideal information. Their consideration may be 
omitted in favor of intent arguments alone, as in the sale from Russia to 
Ecuador. Arguments as to “efficiency” may even be dismissed, as in the 
Cloth case. Regulations may be imposed on agreements where food or health 
are at issue.  
These markets fit the international trading system, which is formed 
around regulated markets such as those in the Cheese and other regulatory 
 224. OGH, [2000] Österreichisches Recht der Wirtschaft (RdW) No. 506, 2 Ob 100/00w (Apr. 13, 
2000), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/000413a3.html (visited Sept. 13, 2004).  
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 9. 
 227. Id. at 10. 
 228. Flechtner, supra note 33, at 249. “We can do it within the Convention.” Id. 
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cases. The regulation may also be that of putting forward the value of equity, 
as opposed to an “efficient” market, as in the Cloth case, or of simply 
dismissing an obvious market argument, as in the Russian arbitration 
regarding Ecuador. The globalization of Western trade has not, in these 
cases, resulted in a wildly enthusiastic embracing of “idealized” market-
oriented thought, because these cases do not trumpet a “free” market or 
efficient market of perfect information.  
These decisions are made primarily pursuant to “standards” in the CISG 
under the provisions governing quality in article 35 and provisions governing 
“objective intent” in articles 8(2) and 8(3). As such, discretion is afforded the 
judges. Yet, the decisions all detail facts that support the legal provisions that 
govern the cases. Patterns in the types of facts applied to the cases, which 
appear to influence the outcomes, can be discerned.  
These patterns have striking significance for the litigator and international 
sales counsel attorney. For example, in the specifications and warranty cases, 
communications arguments can go either way, but in the cases analyzed here, 
communications arguments favored the sellers. Warranties of fitness for a 
specific purpose favor the buyer over straight specifications claims. Market 
arguments tend to favor the buyer across the cases. Health concerns 
strengthen regulatory claims for warranties.  
Thus, the bottom line for practitioners is that sellers can always argue for 
more specificity in specifications, but buyers will want to show the market 
significance of claimed warranties.  
These cases advance the goals of uniformity, good faith, international 
character, and even the promotion of international trade. The text system of 
the first three of these goals is suited by these decisions. Good faith is 
advanced by the article 8(2) rule of construing against the message sender. 
The decisions are fairly uniform and are decided based on CISG law, not by 
reference to domestic laws. The need for interpretive rules to advance the 
goal of good faith in negotiations is also advanced in furtherance of the goal 
of international character. These three textual goals are supported by the 
institutional system of a community of CISG interpreters that, with or 
without citation, acknowledges foreign decisions and has the resources to 
interpret the CISG. These objects of support combine in a way that is suited 
to the world in a “situational system” that allows the decisions to fit the 
world in which they are made. 
This “situational system” is not at any pole or pathway point along most 
of the various dichotomies that are applied to the CISG. It is not the law of 
any one legal system or political block, and it is not the law of “altruism” or 
“individualism.” What can be seen is that the cases do not apply an 
“idealized” market; the cases are of the “real world,” the market of 
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institutions. The CISG is a compromise. As such, it is its own “system,” 
capable of guiding decisions to enforce the system for a long time.  
The “situational system” recognizes the market in a “real world” form, 
compatible with the regulated market of the world economy.  
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